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THERASENSE-LESS: HOW THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT LET POLICY OVERTAKE 
PRECEDENT IN THERASENSE, INC. v. 
BECTON, DICKINSON & CO. 
Abstract: On May 25, 2011, in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 
the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit fundamentally 
restructured the patent law doctrine of inequitable conduct. The court did 
so by holding that both intent and materiality are required for successfully 
claiming the defense, and that materiality must be proven by a but-for test, 
thereby limiting the scope of conduct covered by the doctrine. Although 
in making this change the court may have helped to curb the over usage of 
inequitable conduct, it did so by contradicting Supreme Court precedent. 
Thus, this Comment argues that the Therasense court overstepped its 
bounds and, in its attempt to limit the doctrine, may have unduly nar-
rowed this equitable defense. 
Introduction 
 Inequitable conduct is a judge-made equitable defense to patent 
infringement.1 Under this defense, if the defendant is able to show that 
the patent owner acted inequitably in dealing with the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO), then the patent in question is unenforce-
able.2 Because the result of successfully claiming inequitable conduct is 
so powerful, this defense is a common litigation tactic.3 In fact, it is as-
serted so often that the Federal Circuit has referred to the doctrine as a 
“plague.”4 
 On May 25, 2011, in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sitting en banc limited the 
scope of the inequitable conduct defense.5 The court held that 
Therasense, Inc. (now, Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc.) and Abbott Labora-
                                                                                                                      
1 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense II ), 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
2 Id. at 1285, 1287. 
3 Id. at 1289. 
4 E.g., Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (en banc); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
5 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1296. 
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tories (collectively “Abbott”) committed inequitable conduct, and thus 
dismissed an infringement suit against Becton Dickinson and Co. 
(“Becton”).6 Although the court limited the doctrine in an attempt to 
curb its use, in doing so the court contradicted Supreme Court prece-
dent and may have made the doctrine too narrow to serve its equitable 
purpose.7 
 Part I of this Comment outlines the history of the inequitable 
conduct doctrine.8 Further, it summarizes how the district court and 
the panel of the Federal Circuit applied the doctrine in Therasense.9 
Part II examines how the Federal Circuit fundamentally altered the 
doctrine in an effort to cure what it viewed as a plague.10 Finally, Part 
III explores the origin of the inequitable conduct doctrine.11 Then, it 
argues that the Federal Circuit’s ruling too narrowly restricts the ineq-
uitable conduct doctrine, thereby undermining the purposes of the 
doctrine and countering controlling Supreme Court precedent.12 
                                                                                                                     
I. Abbott’s Patent and the History of Inequitable Conduct 
A. A New Patent, an Old Patent, and a Claim of Infringement 
 On October 13, 1998, the PTO granted to Abbott U.S. Patent No. 
5,820,551 (“the new patent”).13 The new patent covered a specific type 
of disposable blood glucose test strip, used by those with diabetes to 
measure their blood’s glucose level.14 The strip can test whole blood 
(blood that contains all of its components) without a membrane over 
the strip’s electrode.15 This feature differentiated the new patent from 
another patent, also held by Abbott—Patent No. 4,545,382 (“the old 
patent”)—which called for an “optional, but preferable” membrane 
over the electrode.16 
 
6 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1282; Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. 
(Therasense I ), 565 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091, 1114–15 (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
7 See infra notes 13–114 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 13–63 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 13–63 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 63–91 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 92–114 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 92–114 and accompanying text. 
13 U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 (issued Oct. 13, 1998), ruled unenforceable by Therasense I, 
565 F. Supp. 2d 1088. 
14 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1282. 
15 Id. at 1282, 1283. 
16 Id. at 1283; Therasense I, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
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 Abbott held both patents, and to obtain the new patent, it was Ab-
bott’s responsibility to identify previous similar patents and explain why 
the new patent was different.17 In doing so, Abbott had to prove to the 
PTO that, when looking at previous patents, the new patent would not 
have been an obvious next step to a practitioner having an ordinary 
level of familiarity with blood glucose test strips.18 To establish this level 
of non-obviousness, Abbott claimed that a practitioner would have read 
the old patent’s claim of an optional but preferable membrane as mere 
patent phraseology, and that the membrane was, in fact, not optional.19 
After Abbott made this declaration, the new patent was allowed.20 Ab-
bott did not, however, disclose to the PTO that it had made a contradic-
tory statement about the European counterpart to the old patent (the 
“European patent”).21 In discussing the European patent, Abbott had 
argued that the same optional but preferable language meant that the 
strip expressly did not require a membrane.22 
 In March 2004, Becton brought suit against Abbott in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment of non-infringement of two other patents owned by Abbott.23 Ab-
bott responded by countersuing Becton in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California for infringement of these two patents 
and the new patent.24 The case was transferred to the Northern District 
of California, and the court granted summary judgment for non-
infringement on all asserted claims in the non-new patent actions.25 A 
bench trial followed regarding the new patent.26 It was during this trial 
that Abbott’s contradictory statements regarding the “optional, but 
preferable” language—and its failure to disclose this conflict to the Pat-
ent Office—came to light.27 Using these contradictory statements, Bec-
ton asserted a claim of inequitable conduct against Abbott as an affirma-
tive defense.28 
                                                                                                                      
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1283. 
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
19 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1283. 
20 Therasense I, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
21 Id. at 1110. 




26 Id. at 1285. 
27 Therasense I, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–08. 
28 Id. at 1091. 
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B. The Evolution of a Doctrine 
 Although the inequitable conduct doctrine was originally used in 
patent litigation to curb egregious conduct, in recent years, it has been 
expanded considerably to cover a broad range of behavior.29 In the 
Patent Act of 1790, the legislature recognized a private cause of action 
to repeal an improperly obtained patent.30 Furthermore, until 1952, 
subsequent patent statutes contained provisions creating private reme-
dies against such deceptive conduct.31 Yet, despite these remedies, be-
fore 1945, courts were reluctant to enforce these provisions.32 Initially, 
the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of unclean hands to dismiss 
patent cases in which there was extreme misconduct.33 Under the un-
clean hands doctrine, a party cannot seek equitable relief if that party 
has itself violated an equitable principle, such as good faith.34 Accord-
ingly, the Court used this doctrine in patent cases in instances of per-
jury, the manufacture of false evidence, and the suppression of evi-
dence.35 
 Eventually, the unclean hands doctrine evolved into the patent-
litigation doctrine of inequitable conduct.36 Under inequitable con-
duct, a court may repeal the grant of a patent if the party accused of 
patent infringement can show that the party alleging infringement did 
not, while pursuing its patent application, present the PTO with all 
relevant facts concerning possible fraud or inequity, regardless of 
whether the conduct could constitute a violation of law.37 The doctrine 
arose in the Supreme Court’s 1945 case, Precision Instrument Manufactur-
ing, Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.38 In Precision, the Court 
held that a party seeking a patent had to submit all relevant facts to the 
PTO.39 If the party did not submit all such facts, then it had engaged in 
inequitable conduct, which justified the dismissal of its patent in-
                                                                                                                      
29 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1287, 1288. 
30 Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 37, 39 (1993). 
31 Id. at 38. 
32 Id. 
33 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1285. 
34 Black’s Law Dictionary 286 (9th ed. 2009). 
35 See Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 
(1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 240 (1944); Keystone 
Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 243 (1933). 
36 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818; Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1285. 
37 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818. 
38 See id.; Goldman, supra note 30, at 51. 
39 Precision, 324 U.S. at 818. 
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fringement case.40 Accordingly, in Precision, the Court dismissed the 
case after concluding that the party asserting patent infringement had 
committed inequitable conduct by failing to disclose information re-
garding another party’s possible perjury, despite insufficient proof to 
make a case for the actual crime of perjury.41 
 Yet, the Court did not make clear, what conduct was sufficient to 
constitute “inequitableness.”42 As a result, with no clear standard gov-
erning their decisions, lower courts tended to broaden the scope of the 
defense.43 Thus, the doctrine came to cover a broad range of miscon-
duct, including nondisclosure of information.44 In addition, although a 
successful unclean hands defense resulted in the dismissal of the suit at 
hand, a successful inequitable conduct defense became much more 
powerful—it resulted in the patent’s unenforceability.45 
 In light of this stronger remedy, the inequitable conduct doctrine 
came to require first, that the patent holder had specific intent to de-
ceive the PTO, and second, that the missing or fraudulent information 
was material to the granting of the patent.46 Then, if both of those ele-
ments were proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court 
weighed the equities to determine whether the patent holder’s conduct 
warranted the large penalty of rendering the patent unenforceable.47 
 Yet, as the doctrine evolved, the Federal Circuit lowered the intent-
to-deceive standard, no longer requiring a specific intent, and instead 
finding negligence sufficient.48 In addition, the Federal Circuit loos-
ened the definition of “material” to that which a reasonable examiner 
would be substantially likely to consider important.49 Eventually, the 
Federal Circuit placed the intent and materiality elements together on 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. at 819. 
41 See id. at 818–19. 
42 Goldman, supra note 30, at 52. 
43 Id. at 55–67. For example, one court, as it expanded the conduct encompassed with-
in inequitable conduct, noted that “[e]nforcing a patent in [sic] behalf of one who has 
made intentional misrepresentations to the Patent Office, irrespective of the merits of his 
patent application, might encourage an applicant to be dishonest . . . .” Corning Glass 
Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 471 (D. Del. 1966), rev’d on other 
grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1966). 
44 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1287. 
45 Id.; Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 509, 541 (2003). 
46 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1287 (citing Star Scientific Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1287–88 (citing Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
49 Id. at 1288 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
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a sliding scale, allowing a finding of inequitable conduct even if there 
was a weak showing of one element so long as there was a strong show-
ing of the other.50 This materiality-intent-balancing framework essen-
tially conflated and diluted the standards, which were intended to be 
two distinct requirements.51 
 Although the Federal Circuit hoped these changes would encour-
age full disclosure to the PTO, unforeseen consequences emerged.52 
Inequitable conduct became an important litigation strategy, with one 
study estimating that eighty percent of patent infringement cases in-
cluded allegations of inequitable conduct.53 Because of the threat of 
future inequitable conduct claims, those seeking patents consistently 
submitted all possibly relevant pieces of prior art, often overwhelming 
the PTO with unnecessary documents.54 Thus, inequitable conduct’s 
powerful remedy of rendering the entire patent unenforceable incen-
tivized not only an excess of allegations of inequitable conduct, but also 
the over-disclosure of information to the PTO.55 It is no wonder, there-
fore, that the Federal Circuit referred to the doctrine as a “plague.”56 
C. Becton’s Claim of Inequitable Conduct 
 Against this legal backdrop, Becton asserted inequitable conduct 
in Abbott’s infringement suit offering, as evidence, Abbott’s failure to 
disclose the contradictory statements regarding the European patent to 
the PTO.57 The district court found for Becton, holding the new patent 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.58 Abbott appealed the deci-
sion.59 By a split-panel decision, the Federal Circuit upheld the district 
court’s finding of invalidity.60 
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1288. 
53 Ad Hoc Comm. on Rule 56 and Inequitable Conduct, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law 
Ass’n, The Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct and the Duty of Candor in Patent Prosecution: Its Cur-
rent Adverse Impact on the Operation of the United States Patent System, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 74, 75 
(1988). 
54 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1289. 
55 Id. 
56 Burlington Indus., 849 F.2d at 1422. 
57 See Therasense I, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1091, 1107–08. 
58 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1285. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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 Three months later, however, the court granted Abbott’s petition 
for a rehearing en banc.61 The order suggested that the Court was ready 
to reconsider the doctrine of inequitable conduct; parties were asked to 
address how the materiality-intent-balancing framework should be 
modified or replaced.62 Further supporting this inference, Chief Judge 
Randall R. Rader of the Federal Circuit had recently stated that the doc-
trine was “constantly overflowing its banks.”63 
II. Restructuring the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine 
 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge Rader authored a decision he 
openly hoped would change the doctrine of inequitable conduct.64 The 
decision affirmed that a claim of inequitable conduct requires specific 
intent to deceive the PTO.65 Yet, it also held that intent and materiality 
are separate elements, and that they should not be put on a sliding 
scale with one another.66 Furthermore, the court held that for undis-
closed information to meet the materiality requirement, it must meet a 
“but-for” test.67 Under this test, non-disclosed information is material 
only if the PTO would not have allowed the claim had it been aware of 
that information.68 
 The en banc court unanimously supported two of the three 
changes to the doctrine.69 All eleven judges agreed that the two ele-
ments—intent and materiality—are separate elements and should not 
be put together on a sliding scale.70 In addition, all eleven judges 
agreed that the infringer must prove that the patentee acted with spe-
cific intent to deceive and that negligence, even gross negligence, was 
insufficient to meet this standard.71 Nonetheless, because direct evi-
dence of intent to deceive is rare, the court held that intent to deceive 
                                                                                                                      
61 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(granting rehearing en banc). 
62 See id. 
63 See Randall R. Rader, Foreword—Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 
Am. U. L. Rev. 777, 780 (2010). 
64 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense II ), 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 1291. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
70 See Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1290; id. at 1297 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part); id. at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
71 See id. at 1290 (majority opinion); id. at 1297 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part); id. at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
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may be inferred from indirect and circumstantial evidence, but only if 
the inference is the single most reasonable inference from the evi-
dence.72 Thus, if multiple reasonable inferences can be drawn, a court 
cannot find an intent to deceive.73 
 In making these holdings, the Therasense court reaffirmed the Fed-
eral Circuit’s 1988 en banc decision, Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. 
v. Hollister Inc.74 In Kingsdown, the court established that inequitable 
conduct required an intent to deceive.75 Yet, Kingsdown addressed only 
the intent prong of the doctrine; the materiality prong had been ad-
dressed four years earlier, in 1984, by the Federal Circuit in J.P. Stevens 
& Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd.76 The J.P. Stevens & Co formulation governed the 
materiality standard until the court’s decision in Therasense.77 
 It was the change to the materiality standard that sharply divided 
the court.78 By adopting a but-for standard, the Federal Circuit acted 
contrary to its own previous decisions, which had expressly rejected 
such a test.79 Furthermore, such a standard contradicted both the 
PTO’s Rule 56, which governs what information is deemed material by 
the patent office, and the position taken by the PTO in its amicus 
brief.80 Nonetheless, the Therasense majority supported its but-for stan-
                                                                                                                      
72 Id. at 1290. 
73 Id. at 1290–91 (citing Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 
867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
74 See Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1304 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
75 See id. at 1291 (majority opinion) (citing Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 867). 
76 Id. at 1303 (Bryson, J., dissenting); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
77 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1291; id. at 1303–04 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (citing J.P. Ste-
vens & Co., 747 F.2d at 1559). 
78 Id. at 1291 (majority opinion); id. at 1297 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part); id. at 1302–03 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
79 See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 
Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
80 Compare Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1293 (“This court does not adopt the definition of 
materiality in PTO Rule 56.”), with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehear-
ing En Banc in Support of Neither Party at 8–9, Therasense II, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-
1511, 2008-1512, 2008-1513, 2008-1514, and 2008-1595), 2010 WL 3390234 at *8–9 (“The 
single proper standard for materiality should be Rule 56.”). Rule 56 states that information 
is material when it establishes a prima facie case of un-patentability or refutes, or is incon-
sistent with, a position the applicant takes in seeking a patent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010). The 
Therasense majority acknowledged that its standard for materiality was counter to that advo-
cated by the PTO. Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1293. Yet, as the court observed, the PTO is not 
the only body affected by the inequitable conduct doctrine. Id. at 1294. The majority cited 
both the American Bar Association and the American Intellectual Property Law Associa-
tion as supporters for the but-for standard, stating that it is not bound by the definition of 
materiality in the PTO’s rules. Id. 
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dard with the 1928 Supreme Court case, Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan 
Chemical Corp.81 In Corona Cord, the Court declined to extinguish a pat-
ent’s validity because the patentee’s misrepresentation to the patent 
office was not the but-for cause of the patent’s issuance.82 
 In adopting the but-for standard, the Therasense majority recog-
nized that a pure but-for test for materiality would be too rigid for an 
equitable doctrine.83 Thus, the court carved out an exception: cases of 
affirmative egregious misconduct would satisfy the materiality prong.84 
Yet, the court provided little guidance to define the affirmative egre-
gious misconduct exception.85 It did, however, provide one example of 
conduct which would meet the standard—the filing of an unmistakably 
false affidavit—and two examples which would not—nondisclosure of 
prior art references and failure to mention prior art references in an 
affidavit.86 
 In contrast, the dissent argued that a but-for standard was unneces-
sarily severe and would provide little incentive for applicants to be can-
did with the PTO.87 The dissent agreed with the PTO that strictly adher-
ing to a tightened intent standard would largely solve the problems of 
the inequitable conduct doctrine.88 According to the dissent, a but-for 
standard of materiality was an unnecessary step, and one that would 
eliminate incentives to meet disclosure obligations to the PTO.89 Be-
cause under a but-for standard only patents that would not have been 
issued would be invalidated, an applicant with information that could 
prevent the patent from being issued will simply withhold it.90 Thus, 
under such a standard, the applicant loses nothing by withholding the 
information, although under the previous materiality standard, this fail-
ure to disclose would result in the unenforceability of the patent.91 
                                                                                                                      
81 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1291 (citing Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 
276 U.S. 358, 373–74 (1928)); see Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 
324 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1945). 
82 Corona Cord. 276 U.S. at 373–74. 
83 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1292–93. 
84 Id. at 1292. 
85 See id. at 1292–93. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1305–06 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. at 1305; see also Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Ref-
ormation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 905, 944 (2010) (discussing how “patent law is clearly 
seeing the beginning of reform” and how several judicial decisions have “limit[ed] the 
scope of injunctive relief”). 
89 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1305 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 1305–06. 
91 Id. 
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III. A Precedent Problem: Did the Federal Circuit  
Contradict the Supreme Court? 
 The Therasense court, by establishing a but-for standard of material-
ity, not only contravened Supreme Court precedent, but in its attempt 
to limit the doctrine, may have also unduly narrowed this equitable de-
fense.92 Despite the fact that the Therasense court’s establishment of a 
but-for standard and the dissent’s argument against it are policy-driven, 
such a standard implicitly rejects Supreme Court precedent.93 The 
standard contradicts the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision, Precision In-
strument Manufacturing, Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., in 
which the Court formulated the skeletal guidelines for the inequitable 
conduct doctrine.94 
 Although the majority and dissent both recognized the trio of Su-
preme Court cases from which the inequitable conduct doctrine arose, 
neither examined the guidelines for the doctrine established in Preci-
sion.95 The Precision court first used the term “inequitable conduct” in a 
patent litigation setting, giving rise to the doctrine.96 Specifically, in Pre-
cision, the Court recognized the need for a flexible approach in an eq-
uitable claim.97 Thus, in establishing a rigid, but-for standard, the 
Therasense court contravened the Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
doctrine set out in Precision.98 In addition, in formulating the but-for 
standard, the Therasense court concluded that Corona Cord Tire Co. v. 
Dovan Chemical Corp., a 1923 Supreme Court case, supported the estab-
                                                                                                                      
92 See infra notes 93–114 and accompanying text. 
93 See Precision Instrument Mfg., Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 
(1945); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense II ), 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court now tightens the standards for finding both intent and mate-
riality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of the pub-
lic.”); id. at 1305–06 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (discussing the negative repercussions of a but-
for standard for three paragraphs); see also Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1030 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the Federal Circuit is “strictly bound” to follow applicable 
Supreme Court precedent); Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1421 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (rejecting but-for materiality). 
94 See 324 U.S. at 818. 
95 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818–19; Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1285–87; id. at 1306–08 
(Bryson, J., dissenting). 
96 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 819; Holly S. Hawkins & Labriah Lee, Exergen: A Clarification 
to Pleading Inequitable Conduct, Intell. Prop. Litig., Summer 2010, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/practice_areas/062210-intellectual- 
property-exergen-inequitable-conduct.html; D. Christopher Ohly, Therasense: Another Case 
for Rejection of Rigid Rules, Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J., Aug. 2011, at 14, 14. 
97 Ohly, supra note 96, at 15. 
98 See Williams, 240 F.3d at 1030; Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Im-
prove Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 147, 152 (2006). 
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lishment of a but-for materiality test, because Corona Cord illustrated the 
Court’s unwillingness to extinguish a patent’s presumption of validity 
because of a misrepresentation that did not affect the patent’s issu-
ance.99 Yet, the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in Precision, in which 
the Court formulated the standard of the inequitable conduct doctrine, 
was a “striking departure” from Corona Cord.100 
 Furthermore, a but-for standard of materiality narrows the doc-
trine of inequitable conduct beyond the guidelines established in Preci-
sion—that one must disclose to the PTO all facts concerning possible 
fraud and inequitableness.101 Although Precision provides specific guid-
ance as to what information must be disclosed to the PTO to avoid a 
finding of inequitable conduct, this guidance is contradicted by the 
holding in Therasense.102 According to the Precision court, a patent ap-
plicant has an “uncompromising duty to report to [the PTO] all facts 
concerning possible fraud or inequitableness.”103 In contrast, a but-for 
standard requires a patent applicant to disclose only that information 
which would prevent the applicant from receiving the patent, rather 
than all facts concerning fraud or inequitableness.104 Thus, the 
Therasense court tightens the doctrine beyond the language of Preci-
sion.105 Although the Therasense court recognizes an exception for af-
firmative acts of egregious misconduct, the new standard still appears 
too narrow; it explicitly does not cover a failure to mention prior art 
references, conduct seemingly encompassed in a duty to report all facts 
concerning possible fraud or inequitableness.106 
 Although this language from Precision may be classified as dicta, 
the Federal Circuit should still have considered it binding.107 As the 
Federal Circuit has previously acknowledged, it must follow the Su-
                                                                                                                      
99 Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1291. 
100 Goldman, supra note 30, at 51; see 6 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents 
§ 19.03[1][e] (Matthew Bender 2011) (“[The Court] articulated a duty of disclosure of 
applicants and assignees.”). 
101 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818; Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1292. 
102 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818; Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1291; Matthew M. Peters, Leg-
islative Update, The Equitable Inequitable: Adding Proportionality and Predictability to Inequitable 
Conduct in the Patent Reform Act of 2008, 19 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 77, 83 
(2008). 
103 Precision, 324 U.S. at 818. 
104 See Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1291. 
105 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818; Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1291; Ohly, supra note 96, at 
14. 
106 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818; Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1292–93. 
107 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818; Daimlerchrysler Corp. v. United States, 361 F.3d 1378, 
1385 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1350 
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preme Court’s “explicit and carefully considered” language, even if it is 
dicta.108 The Precision Court’s detailed discussion of a patentee’s “un-
compromising duty” to report to the PTO all facts concerning possible 
fraud or inequitableness appears to meet this “explicit and carefully 
considered” threshold.109 The Court dedicated a paragraph to the pub-
lic policy behind its standard for inequitable conduct, stating that one 
must submit all information regarding inequitableness to the PTO in 
order to best serve the public interest by preventing the public from 
becoming victims of deception and fraud.110 
 Thus, the Federal Circuit in Therasense overstepped its bounds in 
establishing a but-for test of materiality.111 As the language from Preci-
sion appears to be explicit and carefully considered, the Therasense court 
should have considered itself bound by it.112 If it had, the court could 
not have ruled in favor of a but-for standard, a rigid test that contra-
dicts the uncompromising duty by patent-seekers to report all facts 
concerning possible fraud or inequitableness stated by Precision.113 Al-
though the doctrine of inequitable conduct has evolved since Precision, 
never before has the range of conduct policed by the doctrine shrunk 
beyond the Supreme Court’s framework—by not requiring disclosure 
of possible inequitableness—until now.114 
Conclusion 
 Facing what it considered to be a growing “plague,” the Federal 
Circuit in Therasense fundamentally altered the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct. It did so by holding that intent and materiality are separate 
elements and cannot be placed on a sliding scale, that intent can only 
be shown by proving a specific intent to deceive the PTO, and that the 
correct test for materiality is a but-for test, in which only information 
that would have prevented the issuance of the patent in question can 
                                                                                                                      
108 See Daimlerchrysler, 361 F.3d at 1385 n.3; Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1350. 
109 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818; Daimlerchrysler, 361 F.3d at 1385 n.3; Stone Container, 229 
F.3d at 1350. 
110 Precision, 324 U.S. at 818. 
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112 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818; Daimlerchrysler, 361 F.3d at 1385 n.3; Stone Container, 229 
F.3d at 1350; Thomas L. Irving et al., The Evolution of Intent: A Review of Patent Law Cases 
Invoking the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct from Precision to Exergen, 35 U. Dayton L. Rev. 
303, 311 (2010) (“Precision Instrument, as arguably the only case where the Supreme Court 
expressly applied the doctrine of inequitable conduct, remains the definitive pronounce-
ment of the law of inequitable conduct.”). 
113 See Precision, 324 U.S. at 818. 
114 See Therasense II, 649 F.3d at 1291; Precision, 324 U.S. at 818. 
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meet the materiality requirement. Although the state of the inequitable 
conduct doctrine may have been in desperate need of change, the Fed-
eral Circuit does not have unfettered discretion to amend the doctrine 
as it sees fit. Furthermore, although there are undoubtedly strong pol-
icy reasons for such a standard, the Federal Circuit cannot limit a pat-
entee’s duty to disclose beyond the framework established by the Su-
preme Court. 
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